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STRATEGIES FOR COMPLEX SUPPLY NETWORKS: 
FINDINGS FROM THE OFFSHORE WIND POWER INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT
Purpose
This paper explores the challenges facing companies that operate within complex supply 
networks and the strategies they employ to manage such complex supply networks. 
Design/methodology/approach
The paper employs mixed methods, combining in-depth case studies with an executive 
forum with senior industry stakeholders. The two in-depth supply network case studies 
were carried out through multiple interviews with focal (or developer) firms that supply 
energy through offshore wind power and key suppliers, such as wind turbine 
manufacturers. 
Findings
The findings show the challenges the offshore wind power industry faces that result from 
complex supply networks, including attempts by several actors to exert their power and 
control. Despite the networks facing similar complexities and challenges, two distinctly 
different strategies for orchestrating and governing supply networks are uncovered: one 
strategy resembles an interventionist strategy, while the other is based on delegation.
Research limitations/implications
Based on the findings we identify and develop a classification of complex supply network 
divided into intervention and delegation strategies, thereby adding to existing research on 
ways to manage complex supply networks.
Practical implications
We identify strategies for focal firms for managing in complex supply networks, based on 
control and intervention or coordination and delegation.  
Originality/value
Existing research on supply network strategies has largely focused on non-complex 
contexts. Our paper draws from complex adaptive systems and organisational behaviour 
perspectives to contribute original insights into supply network strategies in complex 
supply networks.  
Keywords: complex supply networks, supply network strategies, offshore wind power
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STRATEGIES FOR COMPLEX SUPPLY NETWORKS: 
FINDINGS FROM THE OFFSHORE WIND POWER INDUSTRY
1. INTRODUCTION1
Supply chains are inherently complex and therefore best conceptualized as networks (Carter 
et al., 2015). This realization has given rise to alternative ways of describing supply chains, in 
particular, as supply chain networks (Lambert and Cooper, 2000) or simply supply networks 
(hereafter SNs) (Harland, 1996; Choi and Dooley, 2009). Despite the understanding of SNs as 
inherently complex (Braziotis et al., 2013), little research to date (Choi et al., 2001; Choi and 
Hong, 2002) has sought to conceptualize the different dimensions of SN complexity (Pathak 
et al., 2007) and understand the different strategies for managing complex SNs. 
Some industries involve inherently complex SNs e.g. oil and gas, construction of offshore-wind 
power (OWP) farms where a very large number of actors are involved both upstream and 
downstream and where products consist of complex product systems or complex product-
services. The context of our research is OWP, which is strategically important to many 
countries to move away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy. One of the key challenges 
for the OWP industry is that it is a relatively new and developing industry and its SNs are 
complex because of, e.g. the size and diversity of the supply base (EWEA, 2014). Furthermore, 
OWP projects span several phases, including development, installation, operations and 
maintenance, and the SNs relevant to each phase change over the course of these phases. 
OWP SNs have been described as distributed as they are characterized by many actors that 
try to control them (Andersen and Drejer, 2008) leading to complex and dynamic interactions. 
In recent years, concepts such as procuring complex performance (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009; 
Howard and Caldwell, 2014) have emerged to address the unique challenges of complex 
industries, including the need to understand supply and delivery of complex product-service 
packages over a long life-cycle that spans from conceptualization to production, operations, 
service and maintenance. However, to date little research has examined SNs in such 
industries, leading to a lack of understanding of the challenges posed by SN complexity and 
strategies used to manage complex SNs. Therefore, this paper addresses the following two 
research questions: 
What are the specific challenges facing companies that operate within complex SNs and what 
strategies do they employ to manage complex SNs?
We build on two theoretical perspectives. Seeking to understand SN complexity and 
governance, we draw from Choi et al.s (2001) work that has sought to conceptualize SNs as 
complex adaptive systems (CAS), which in turn draws from complexity theory (Kauffman, 
1995). This perspective is gaining traction in the supply chain literature, also in Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal (Statsenko et al., 2018; Touboulic et al., 2018). In 
1 This paper builds on data developed in the multidisciplinary research project ReCoE (Reducing Cost 
of Energy in the Offshore Wind Energy Sector through Supply Chain Innovation) funded by the 
University of Southern Denmark. We wish to thank the whole ReCoE team, in particular, Professor 
Ram Narasimhan and Professor Jan Stentoft. 
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developing an understanding of SN strategies, we also build on the concepts of managerial 
intervention and delegation originating in the organizational behaviour and organizational 
economics literature but with a specific focus on how these concepts are applicable in a SN 
context (Lamming, 1996; Johnsen, 2011). Within our study of the OWP industry, we draw from 
two embedded case studies of OWP SNs and a workshop with senior industry practitioners. 
The findings contribute to SN theory, in particular the existing frameworks on strategies for 
managing different types of SNs.
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. SN strategy classifications
Despite many classifications of inter-organizational networks (e.g. Grandori and Soda, 1995; 
Hinterhuber and Levin, 1994) and supply chains, none had attempted to classify SNs until early 
2000. Lamming et al. (2000) proposed the first classification of SNs based on two dimensions: 
degree of product uniqueness-innovativeness, and degree of product complexity. Harland et 
al. (2001) introduced two dimensions: degree of dynamics, and degree of focal firm SN 
influence. The first dimension referred to dynamics in internal operations process and external 
market, and industry maturity. The second factor was a function of a focal firms ability to 
influence the SN. SN influence has been explored, typically from a power or relational 
perspective. Thus, Chang et al. (2012) classify SNs into four different types defined by the 
power position of the focal firm relative to its suppliers and buyers: upstream network 
dominance, focal firm dominance, focal firm obedience and downstream network dominance. 
This links closely with research by Cox and colleagues (e.g. Cox et al. 2002) and the wider 
literature on power in buyer-supplier relationships (e.g. Ireland and Webb, 2007).
Most attempts to classify SNs or supply chains have concentrated on the lean-agile dimension 
(e.g. Vonderembse et al., 2006), typically based on analysis of highly dynamic and turbulent 
contexts, such as FMCG. However, these SN classifications tend to be private sector, high 
volume and repetitive manufacturing industries that face different complexities compared 
with a product-service and public-private sector context, such as OWP, with a strong focus on 
whole-life management that includes installation, production, operations and maintenance.
2.2. Supply Network (SN) Complexity
Among the definitions of SN complexity in the literature, Choi and Krause (2006) define supply 
base complexity as a function of the number of suppliers in the supply base, the level of 
supplier interaction or inter-relationships, and supplier differentiation. The greater the number 
of suppliers, their variation and level of interaction, the greater the operational load borne 
by the focal company in managing its supply base (Choi and Krause, 2006, p. 639). Vachon and 
Klassens (2002) multi-dimensional definition of supply chain complexity likewise includes 
numerousness and interconnectivity but adds system unpredictability. Bozarth et al. (2009) 
distinguish downstream from upstream complexity and dynamic complexity. Downstream 
complexity includes the number of customers, the heterogeneity of customer needs, the 
average length of the product life cycle, and the variability of demand. Upstream complexity 
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includes the number of supplier relationships to manage, delivery lead-time, reliability of 
suppliers, and extent of global sourcing. 
Choi et al. (2001) conceptualize SNs as complex adaptive systems (CAS). The CAS perspective 
includes the following ideas: self-organization, emergent structures and behavior, simple 
interactions among SN entities, and non-linear dynamics. Although there have been some 
attempts to use CAS to better understand SN complexity, the majority of these is concerned 
with modeling of complexity from a technical or operational research (OR) perspective (e.g. 
Hearnshaw and Wilson, 2013; Pathak et al., 2007). Recent studies have attempted to use CAS 
to analyse specific types of SNs, such as regionals SNs (Statsenko et al., 2018) and sustainable 
SNs in the food industry (Touboulic et al., 2018). 
Pathak et al. (2007) distinguish between complexity and complicatedness, identifying that 
where complicated systems may be intricate, complex systems involve nonlinear dynamic 
interactions amongst individual parts. SNs may be complex, therefore, not only because of 
their structure but also because of interactions between and dynamics amongst SN actors and 
changes in SNs over time in accordance with the CAS tenet of emergent behaviour. 
From a business unit i.e. internal firm perspective, Aitken et al. (2016) discuss whether supply 
chain actors should seek to r duce or absorb complexity. They argue that supply chain 
complexity may not always have an adverse impact on performance, such as complexity 
caused by product customisation, and that instead the key is to identify necessary (strategic) 
and unnecessary (dysfunctional) supply chain complexity and respond accordingly. Thus, it 
may be appropriate not simply to reduce but to absorb complexity. 
2.3. Procuring complex performance and product-service systems
The literature on Procuring Complex Performance (PCP) and Product-Service Systems is 
relevant because it involves complex industries. PCP focuses on the challenges of managing 
total supply chain operations during the lifecycle phases of a major project or programme 
including design, build, service support and disposal (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009; Caldwell and 
Howard, 2011). PCPs may involve capital-intensive public-private collaborations where there 
is an increased risk of oligopolistic market conditions and frequent political interference. PCP 
typically defines complexity in terms of the extent to which infrastructural components of the 
whole system are highly customized, the number of stakeholders and the length of 
planning/contracting negotiation and construction phases (Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). These 
are dimensions that are not typically included in CAS research. 
PCP often involves the delivering of high-value product or platform infrastructure, with long-
term requirements for in-service support. PCP draws on the work on Complex Product-
Systems (CoPS) (e.g. Davies et al., 2006). CoPS involve engineering-intensive products or 
systems supplied in units of one or small batches, usually tailored to meet the precise 
requirements of each customer. Where CoPS can be viewed as a subset of projects 
concerned with the development, manufacture and delivery of complex capital goods (Davies 
and Hobday, 2005, p22), PCP adds whole-life support and maintenance. The CoPS literature is 
relevant to the OWP context, which is characterized by multi-firm projects, highly engineered, 
customized, capital intensive products in small quantities along with operational support and 
maintenance. 
Focusing on contracts and governance mechanisms for handling complex procurement 
involving many actors, Olsen et al. (2005) identify the importance of incentives, authority and 
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trust in the governance of procurement in the oil and gas industry. Where much of the 
literature on complex SNs focuses on the number and diversity of actors and the relationships 
between these, Olsen et al. (2005) and other studies, applying a similar perspective on 
industries such as defence or healthcare, focus more on political and regulatory influences and 
the often-conflicting goals of stakeholders. These industries tend to span both private and 
public sectors and often involve public-private partnership (PPP) contracts (Zheng et al., 2008). 
The OWP context involves many supply chain entities with, at times, conflicting goals of 
stakeholders. For example, with the wide-spread use of contractual governance in OWP, 
despite the recognized need for innovation and cost reduction, SN entities often do not focus 
on innovation, preferring to focus on meeting the terms of their contracts. Much of the 
literature that study public-private buyer-supplier relationships focus on different governance 
arrangements, drawing from earlier contributions by e.g. Poppo and Zenger (2002) and 
Mahapatra et al. (2010). The consensus is that using both contractual and relational 
mechanisms generates more efficient outcomes than the use of either in isolation (Zheng et 
al., 2008), ensuring clearly articulated terms and conditions, remedies, and processes of 
dispute resolution. As Roehrich and Lewis (2014) point out, studies in PCP are limited by their 
relatively narrow conceptualization of complexity that focuses on the size of a system and its 
number of component parts. Like much PCP research, Roehrich and Lewis (2014) are more 
concerned with dyadic relationship governance and less concerned with wider SN 
management issues. 
2.3. Strategies for managing complex SNs: theoretical perspectives
The literature on SN tends to conceptualize SN complexity from a structural perspective 
largely based on a mass-production or repetitive private-sector manufacturing context. In 
comparison, the literature on PCP and complex product systems focuses on industries that are 
inherently complex because of being project and lifecycle-based; these industries tend to 
cross private and public sector and are influenced by a wider group of stakeholders who often 
have conflicting objectives. This literature highlights the role of relationship governance 
through contracts, considering risk and reward sharing arrangements and incentive 
structures. The review points to two theoretical perspectives related to the question of 
management SNs: to control or self-organize from a CAS perspective, and to intervene or 
delegate from a behavioural perspective. 
2.3.1. Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) perspective: control or self-organizing?
Choi et al. (2001) discuss the question of SN control versus emergence. By depicting SNs as 
CAS, they argue that SNs are self-organizing structures that emerge rather than being 
deliberately designed and controlled by individual SN actors. Choi et al. (2001) state that: 
We propose that many supply networks emerge rather than result from purposeful design 
by a singular entity. Imposing too much control detracts from innovation and flexibility; 
conversely, allowing too much emergence can undermine managerial predictability and work 
routines. Therefore, when managing supply networks, managers must appropriately balance 
how much to control and how much to let emerge. p. 351
Thus, each SN entity or node may attempt to manage a portion of its SN but must accept that 
distant parts of the network are essentially not in its direct control. (Carter et al., 2015). Choi 
et al. (2001) state that the environment exists external to the SN and consists of agents and 
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their interconnections that are not part of the given complex adaptive system. The boundary 
between the supply network and the environment is fluid and changes in CAS occur through 
alterations in boundaries, as agents are included or excluded, and such change alters the 
underlying patterns of interaction. 
Recent research has applied the CAS perspective to explore the emergent aspects of SN 
sustainability strategies. Touboulic et al.s study (2018) suggests that individual actors within 
an SN as well as actors in the external environment, such as consortia, play a critical role in 
shaping the direction of strategy, although strategies develop through a process of self-
organisation and emergence rather than top-down control. 
2.3.2. Organizational behaviour and economics perspective: Intervention and delegation
The concepts of intervention and delegation are used in organizational behaviour as 
alternative ways to manage employees. Within organizations, delegation is entrusting or 
empowering employees (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Delegating responsibility is a way to 
motivate employees (Osterloh and Frey, 2000) and requires trust in employees to carry out 
their tasks without overt managerial control. In contrast, intervention implies authoritative 
action; it often has a negative association, although it can also be regarded more positively. 
Intervention can also be due to opportunism (Williamson, 1996) and can restrict creativity and 
be damaging to overall value creation. 
Although terminology may be different, the supply chain and network literature uses similar 
concepts to describe different ways of exercising managerial control. Where delegation is 
used in an intra-organizational context, the supply chain literature talks about cascading 
decisions, enabling first-tier suppliers to manage their own (2nd tier) suppliers and so forth. 
Supply chain tiering is a delegation strategy combined with modularization where first-tier 
suppliers assume the full responsibility for design and development of an entire module, 
supplying a full system (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Much of the more recent supply chain 
management literature on modularisation links product design with supply chain design (Pero 
et al. 2010); Khan et al., 2012; Pashaei and Olhager, 2015). Pero et al. (2010) find evidence 
that modularity reduces supply chain collaboration complexity, although this increases with 
increased product innovativeness and may depend on the industry context (Doran et al., 
2007). 
Comparing cascade and intervention strategies, Lamming (1996) argues that intervention is 
operationalized in supply chains as a customer interfering in a suppliers decision making. 
Johnsen (2011) takes this view a step further by conceptualizing intervention as a way for a 
customer to intervene in a suppliers SN, thereby degrading the suppliers ability to control its 
own network. Whereas SN delegation (or cascade) is clearly a signal of empowerment and 
trust in suppliers, intervention is therefore exercised through power. Power can be exercised 
in different ways, using coercive and non-coercive means. Coercive exploitation of power is 
often viewed negatively and might backfire (Hausman and Johnston, 2010; Ireland and Webb, 
2007) and exploitation of power can impact negatively on trust (Jain et al., 2014). Linking 
delegation and intervention strategies to SN-enabled innovation, Narasimhan and Narayanan 
(2013, p30) argue that the effective utilization of supplier capabilities and technologies must 
consider the firms position with respect to the SN, complementarity of technologies within 
the SN, and the method with which the focal firm controls the suppliers in the network.
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2.4. Summary
Our definition of SN complexity goes beyond the definitions based on CAS, which define SN 
complexity largely in terms of structural complexity i.e. horizontal complexity, vertical 
complexity, and spatial complexity (e.g. Choi et al., 2001). Building on PCP and CoPS, we define 
SN complexity both in terms of structural complexity (but also including stakeholders e.g., 
regulators) and product-service complexity (including customization and life cycle operational 
support and maintenance). Even though a SN cannot be fully controlled by any party (Choi et 
al., 2001) one might influence the ways in which it organizes itself. Thus, we expect some 
generic strategies for the management of complex SNs: balancing self-organization 
(emergence) and direct control (in the CAS perspective), intervention versus delegation or 
cascade approach (in the organization theory perspective) and product modularization and 
modular supply chains (in the organizational economics perspective). The unanswered 
question is: what types of complexity drive firms to choose specific SN management 
strategies?
3. METHODOLOGY   
This paper aims to answer two questions: (1) What are the specific challenges facing 
companies that operate within complex SNs, and (2) what strategies do they employ to 
manage complex SNs? Thus, given the aim to explore SN complexity and the strategies 
companies employ to cope with this complexity, we decided to adopt an in-depth case study 
strategy (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014) followed by an executive forum. Case studies allow us to 
develop an understanding of inter-organizational dynamics by collecting data through 
interviews with multiple network actors (Halinen and Törnroos, 2005). We report on the 
findings from two SN case studies where each case is defined in terms of an inter-
organizational SN that centers on a focal firm: what is known in the offshore industry as a 
developer firm. The paper adopts a qualitative research approach utilizing a comparative case 
study (Yin, 2014). The case study approach allows for the investigation of a phenomenon of 
interest in all its richness in its natural context (Johnston et al., 1999; Narasimhan, 2014) and 
allows alternation between theory and empirical-knowledge in the research-process (Yin, 
2014). We selected two cases that offer a sharp contrast in the offshore wind industry: one 
with a powerful focal firm (developer) and one with a more dispersed structure. Although the 
two cases are separate, suppliers often supply several developers and are part of several 
networks upstream.
A semi-structured interview guide was developed through an abductive process (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002), identifying concepts through literature review and exploring themes and 
interview questions through industry partner collaboration in the research project. Appendix 
A shows an abbreviated version of this, including the main literature references that 
underpinned the concepts explored in each section (an adapted version was used for supplier 
interviews). Initial versions of an interview guide and protocol were refined through 
exploratory interviews with our existing industry contacts. In addition to contextual questions, 
the themes included: project, lifecycle and structural supply network complexity, actor 
relationships and inter-dependencies, power balance and control, and governance such as risk 
and reward sharing arrangements and contractual issues (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Mapping of Alpha and Beta SNs and their overlaps 
We conducted altogether 12 interviews in six companies (two developers and four suppliers). 
The interviewed suppliers included a wind turbine manufacturer, a foundation supplier, a 
substation supplier, and an installation/O&M supplier. These were seen as key supply network 
partners. We also interviewed a professional body as a key stakeholder to gain further insights 
on the OWP industry. Each interview lasted 1.5-3.0 hours with two interviews in each 
company except one. The major themes of the interview guide included company background, 
role in the SNs, project and lifecycle complexity, issues around governance complexity such as 
power and dependence, supplier relationships, sourcing strategies and integration 
mechanisms (see Appendix A for detailed interview guide). The interviews involved drawing 
of the SNs using a flipchart to gain a visual overview of the SNs and estimation of some SN 
complexity dimensions. Figure 1 shows a condensed version of the two maps and overlaps 
across the SNs. All interviews were recorded, fully transcribed, coded and categorized (Miles 
et al., 2014). We consolidated and clustered our codes into two sets of meaningful themes, 
one for SN complexity (Table 1) and another one for SN complexity management strategies 
(Table 2). Finally, we checked for errors and aligned the authors understanding and 
interpretations of the content of the themes (DeCuir-Gunby et al., 2011).
After completing the case studies, we held a one-day executive forum to complement the case 
study findings and to present the initial case findings to industry stakeholders for validation. 
Eleven senior industry executives participated in the forum, including some of the 
representatives of developers and suppliers already interviewed. In addition, representatives 
from industry associations and a small number of suppliers and developers not already 
interviewed were also present. Figure 2 illustrates the analytical boundaries between the two 
SN case studies and the executive forum. Where each of the two case studies focused on one 
SN, the executive forum involved both SN actors, who participated in the case studies, and 
other developer firms, suppliers and service providers (such as consultants) and industry 
associations.  
The forum took the form of an interactive workshop where one senior research team member 
facilitated a discussion around the same topics as explored through the case study interviews. 
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The topics were: drivers of OWP supply network complexity, consequences of OWP lifecycle, 
and actions or initiatives to reduce or manage supply network complexity. As this was a 
discussion we did not stick to a pre-developed set of questions but invited the participants to 
provide their insights around these three topics. Our intention was not to link answers from 
participants specifically to either of the two SN case studies but the findings from the 
executive forum were instrumental in providing a wider understanding of the industry context 
and its challenges and thus helped to interpret the case study results. In addition, the forum 
aided in our understanding of the driving forces of complexity and the SN strategies applied 
by developer firms to manage this complexity. The workshop was recorded, transcribed and 
coded. The research members also took notes during the forum to reflect on the discussion.
Figure 2. Case study and forum boundaries
4. OWP industry background, case studies and findings
4.1. Background
This section presents background of the OWP industry to assist understanding of the 
complexity facing the industry. An offshore wind project goes through four distinct phases: 
project development & concession, installation and commissioning, operations & 
maintenance and decommissioning. Typically, each phase entails a set of different actors 
constituting the SN. Hence, SN actors often change from phase to phase (Stentoft and 
Mikkelsen, 2016). The industry faces high market and industry uncertainty and dynamics due 
to changes in political decisions. The political demand for local content and cost reduction 
have forced changes in the SN:  there is a push for lower CoE [cost of energy], but at the 
same time [they] push for local content. There are some contradictions [in this]  (exec. forum 
participant). The increased size of offshore projects and the fact that projects move further 
and further offshore and onto deeper waters add technical and weather challenges in 
planning and managing the SN, in particular, during the installation phase (case study 1: 
Alpha). As one executive forum participant put it: Every site is different  tower, foundation 
etc. different products and circumstances for every project.
Moreover, the industry suffers from a lack of industry-wide standards driving complexity and 
hence cost (exec. forum discussion). The fast change in technology is a source of further 
complexity decreasing economies of scale (EoS) potential and hence driving cost up  missing 
economies of scale in general in the business, because [the high] speed of technology 
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10
development and high investments and low quantities... CoE [cost of energy] is the target, but 
technology is moving so fast that it is hard to deal with that (exec. forum participants).
Even though the supply base is practically identical for the different offshore players (at least 
for regional offshore wind projects), SNs of individual projects differ in complexity and in the 
ways each SN members operate, govern, interact, manage risk, etc. These differences are 
mostly defined by the way the offshore wind project developers, or the hub or focal firms, 
operate. In this paper we adopt the focal perspective of the developers of the two SNs.
As part of the same industry, both SNs faced many of the same types of complexities and 
challenges; however, they employ different strategies to cope with the challenges. In the 
following section, we report the findings from each case study, taking the perspective of the 
developer or hub firms in order to analyse and bound each SNs. We use pseudonyms to 
disguise the real names of the SN actors involved.
4.2. Case study 1: Alpha SN
Alpha is a major OWP developer with approximately 1500 employees allocated to the offshore 
wind business. Alpha operates in all the markets in the North Sea (notably UK, Germany, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands). Alphas SN consists of a large number of actors, scattered 
globally, but mainly concentrated in northern Europe. The actors in the SNs often change in 
each phase and project lifecycle so the SN structures constantly change. Furthermore, as 
Alpha is a project organization, suppliers often change from project to project due to prices, 
technology, capability and availability.
Alpha is powerful, not only due to its size and large continuous pipeline, enabling the company 
to leverage its power over 1st tier suppliers, but also due to reputation and perceived 
expertise. Until recently, Alpha and other developers were highly dependent on one wind 
turbine manufacturer. However, as one other major wind turbine player has recently 
emerged, followed by other players, this dependency has begun to decrease. Hence, power 
in the Alpha SN is concentrated on Alpha as a large developer firm and the two major turbine 
manufacturers. In larger offshore projects, products and services are typically dual sourced as 
a risk reduction strategy. Foundation manufacturers, array cables and installation companies 
have less power within the SN as their products or services are more or less standardized. 
They are all dependent on Alpha and turbine manufacturers. 
However, no frame agreements are made between Alpha and its 1st tier suppliers. As one of 
the interviewees stated:  as we dont know if we will need them [products or suppliers] for 
the next project. Being a large and financially strong company with long-term internal 
expertise on offshore wind projects, Alpha can take a large amount of risk. Perceiving itself as 
excelling in managing complex projects, Alpha governs the SN activities by detailed multi-
contract management, including contracts directly with selected 2nd tier suppliers, e.g., by 
specifying steel manufacturers for foundations and they produce detailed component 
specifications for suppliers to follow. Engaging in 150-180 CAPEX (capital expenditure) 
contracts for a typical project is not uncommon. Thus, Alpha takes upon itself much of the risk 
of project coordination from engineering, procurement, construction and installation (EPCI) 
of an offshore wind project, including detailed product specifications. Alpha believes that this 
detailed management and interventionist approach takes cost out of the SN because what 
we are really good at is to run and manage large scale complex projects  and getting 
contracts [working] together 
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Due to the inherent narrow weather windows for installing foundations, cables and offshore 
wind turbines, planning is a complex and challenging task. Increasing project and turbine sizes 
coupled with projects moving farther and farther offshore into deeper waters also increase 
project-planning challenges. As one 1st tier interviewee stated:  because of that 
[seasonality]  makes it difficult to plan, and therefore complicated to manage  and the 
weather that impacts our project Even a minor delay on foundations, turbines or transport 
material will significantly affect project cost and duration. Alpha performs scenario analysis to 
test whether the turbines, foundations, vessels and so forth are available according to plan 
and that the plan does not entail conflicting activities. Most important are export cables and 
substations: if a few turbines lack installation, or are not connected, power can still be 
generated. If a substation or the export cable (cable connecting the offshore and onshore 
substation) is not in place no power is transferred despite the amount of power being 
generated. As another risk-mitigating strategy, Alpha has its employees placed at some 
suppliers premises to interact and ensure quality during manufacturing.
4.3. Case study 2: Beta SN 
Beta acts as the focal company in the second SN and employs approximately 160 staff 
dedicated to developing and installing offshore wind projects. Compared to other developers, 
Beta is a minor and less prominent company. Beta is a recent entrant in the offshore wind 
industry, so their project pipeline is limited, scattered and non-continuous. The company 
operates in Denmark, Germany and France but not yet in the UK offshore wind market. Beta 
faces many of the same complexities and challenges as Alpha. Its SN requires the same types 
of suppliers although operating within a narrower geographical market. Unlike Alpha, Beta 
interacts with only a few (three or four) main suppliers in each project who in turn coordinate 
and control sub-tier suppliers. Beta is winning larger projects, but due to its limited financial 
size, Beta cannot take on the very large projects. Like Alpha, Beta also faces the lack of 
standards on health and safety regulations. 
Betas business model and strategy is based on risk avoidance and management. Projects need 
to be financed up front with a traditional split of own equity and external funding of 30/70. 
As institutional investors are risk minimizers, Beta calculates all risks into projects up front, 
before securing investment. Consequently, suppliers - especially turbine manufacturers  that 
account for approximately 40% of CAPEX, must be bankable (i.e. proven technology). 
Therefore, only tested and proven technology and suppliers are allowed onto their projects; 
as the CEO at Beta stated regarding their risk aversion:  so it is much about our position [in 
the market] but also the general risk profile  we have to be sure that as much risk as possible 
is quantified and [harnessed]  and on turbines we play safe.
Unlike Alpha, Beta envisions itself not as a wind farm owner and operator, but as a key player 
in bringing investors together and creating profitable investment projects. Projects are 
developed and operated to present them as a viable financial venture for institutional 
investors; operating an offshore wind farm is not in itself Betas objective. The project is 
merely seen as a conveyer for generating cash flow and earnings by selling equity from 
concession to power connection to the grid. Thus, Beta works more in line with a property 
developer rather than a construction firm. However, in recent years, they have moved 
towards some asset ownership in operating wind farms to generate a continuous cash flow in 
order not to be overly dependent on the timing of securing projects. Given Betas dependency 
on wind turbine manufacturers, the power in this SN lies with the turbine manufacturers. 
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Betas lack of power is evident by the fact that Beta sometimes experiences a lack of interest 
when requesting tenders for new projects.
Beta has contractual relationships with 1st tier suppliers but seldom engages with the second-
tier suppliers and beyond. Betas strategy to decrease complexity and risk is to use systems 
sourcing arrangements, delegating risk and responsibility to suppliers for coordination tasks 
such as installation and detailed planning. For example, the turbine supplier is responsible for 
installation including crew and vessels. The respondent at Beta stated:  we have an opinion 
about who the [tier 1 suppliers] use as tier 2 suppliers and the level of quality etc., but the 
supplier the [tier 1 suppliers] choose is secondary. We do not want to take upon us risk by 
interfering  Naturally, this adds to Betas dependency, but Betas strategy is that it takes a 
coordination responsibility for the various installations  cables, foundations, turbines and 
substations. Beta does not have long term frame agreements with 1st tier suppliers as their 
fear is that it will get locked in with a supplier while another supplier comes with a new and 
better solution or cost level  and you never know if you win the project.
Even if Beta does not install as far offshore as Alpha the actors are still exposed to planning 
challenges due to seasonality and weather conditions for installation of the wind farm, 
although not to the same degree, and risk is often shared with suppliers. However, as Beta 
bids on more and larger projects further offshore, this type of challenges is likely to increase 
in the future.
4.4. Cross case analysis
4.4.1 Challenges and SN complexities (developer perspective)
Table 1 shows the sources of complexity identified and compares how these were evident in 
the two cases. Based on the two SNs researched, we identify a variety of SN complexity 
sources, related to structural, lifecycle, relation l, integration and technology complexity. 
Structural dimensions are generally used to define SN complexity in the literature (Choi and 
Krause, 2006). In OWP, structural complexities come from three major sources: (1) the use of 
large wind turbines installed in deep water, (2) the number of suppliers of different sizes and 
geographical coverage (3) changing political and stakeholder demand and regulations. These 
three sources can influence each other, depending on the geographical location and its 
political stability. 
Both cases demonstrate how lifecycle complexity is created as a result of changing SN actors 
from one project phase to another. Both cases show the challenges and complexities of 
changing SNs throughout the phases in a project lifetime and from project to project. As one 
executive forum participant put it: you cannot get the commitment that you will get the next 
ten projects so you can cover your investment You are only in bed with the costumer project 
by project. Both developers are confronted with project complexity originating from 
differences in standards in terms of e.g., health & safety regulation between countries. 
However, while Alpha faces challenges of balancing resources and management attention 
between overlapping offshore wind farm projects, Beta struggles more with challenges of 
projects being sequential and scattered. 
Relational complexity concerns the balance of power, interactions between SN actors, the use 
of modularization and standardisation and intervention by the end customers. Alpha directly 
manages many 1st tier suppliers, which creates structural complexity due to reduced task 
partitioning:  some of the processes [tasks] are extremely thinly sliced, which is not healthy 
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if you want to drive out cost  (O&M supplier).  At the same time Alpha uses its power to 
reduce relational complexity by coordinating interactions among its 1st tier suppliers. Even 
though the manufacturing of turbines is industrialized, the OWP industry is generally 
characterized by a low level of standardization and modularization as offshore wind projects 
are handled as one off projects.  
Both cases show how integration causes complexity due to the lack of logistics capacity and 
knowledge-sharing as well as a low level of transparency.  Knowledge sharing is limited as 
actors do ot know if they will work together or as competitors on the next project. Finally, 
technology adds complexity through the high rate of technological change. One outcome is 
that e.g., installation vessel providers seek customer commitment before investing in new and 
larger vessels, while customers request vessel providers to be ready before committing.  Beta 
mitigates technological complexity by choosing proven technologies, although this restricts 
the sizes and types of contracts it can secure. 
4.4.2 Challenges and SN complexities (supplier perspectives)
Overall, suppliers face less complexity because they focus on managing the SN of their own 
components or systems, except in the case of wind turbine suppliers, who face a high rate of 
structural and technological innovation due to turbine size and design. Increasing turbine sizes 
cause logistical challenges for other SN actors as modes of transportation, installation and 
lifting equipment may not be suitable for the new designs. Increasing turbine sizes represent 
an ongoing challenge on both land and at sea. For example, foundation suppliers are affected 
by the design and size of wind turbines as this alters both water depth and steel towers that 
connect foundations and turbines. Thus, interdependency between suppliers becomes a 
significant challenge. 
Furthermore, the lack of standardization and the way that developers operate add further 
complexity for suppliers. The low level of standardization makes it hard for suppliers to 
forecast and optimize their operations. Even steel for the towers (e.g. in terms of thickness 
and size) are specifically designed for individual projects so although steel plates are a 
commodity, they can only be ordered once orders are secured. As expressed by a foundation 
supplier:
 we cannot produce to stock, as we never know [if we get the job].. You cannot source 
before you get the order for the project  so no frame agreement  at the same time there is 
a high penalty for late deliveries, so OTIF [On Time In Full] is very important 
The distinct operating modes of different developers causes further complexity for suppliers. 
In some instances, suppliers act as 1st tier suppliers, where they may take part in the design 
process, while in other instances they operate as sub-tier suppliers where they may even be 
required to act as subcontractor to their peers or even to competitors. Such changing roles in 
different situations clearly adds to supplier complexity:  we are often faced with being both 
a supplier and competitor or customer and competitor in different contexts, and that you need 
to be able to handle (Substation supplier).
The structure of the tendering process further adds complexity for suppliers. Typically, more 
than one developer submits wind farm project tenders. In the same vein, each developer 
invites more than one supplier to bid for their part of the project (e.g. for foundations). Hence, 
the further upstream in the supply chain the more suppliers are involved in bidding for the 
same project. Consequently, suppliers often find themselves preparing multiple offers for the 
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same project but for different customers requiring different turbine brands with different 
specifications or scope. Suppliers therefore need to have the capacity to bid simultaneously 
for multiple projects whilst being pushed for both cost and time: 
one thing is pretty clear in the industry  that time windows for fabrication and supplying are 
getting smaller and smaller, from year to year  and it is never the same design that the 
customers want  Its adding complexity thats true, and at the end of the day it adds costs. 
(Foundation supplier)
Table 1. Sources of complexity
Complexity 
dimension
Sources of complexity Case comparison (developer and supplier 
perspectives)
Structural
 Physical size of wind farms and 
components
 Deep water installation 
 Political stakeholder influence e.g. 
demands for local content
 Governmental regulations
 Diverse suppliers (size & 
geographical)
 Beta faced less structural complexity than Alpha 
due to lower number of 1st tier suppliers, but 
Betas 1st tier suppliers faced a high structural 
complexity
 Alpha suppliers faced less structural complexity 
than Beta suppliers (except wind turbine 
manufacturers)
Lifecycle
 Product-service system spanning long 
lifecycle
 Suppliers and service providers 
change over lifecycle
 Both developers faced high lifecycle complexity
 Suppliers less affected by lifecycle complexity 
Relational
 Distributed power: not one actor 
controlling SN  
 Inter-connected SN actors
 Customer intervention in supplier 
choice 
 Modularisation and standardization 
at early state in parts of SN 
 Both Beta and Alpha faced high relational 
complexity; Alpha more power to control
 Major suppliers faced inter-connection problems 
(e.g., between foundations, steel tower, wind 
turbine)
Integration
 Lack of logistics capacity
 Lack of knowledge sharing
 Low level of transparency
 Both developers faced lack of integration
 Alpha faced higher coordination load due to large 
number of 1st tier suppliers
 Very limited integration and knowledge sharing 
among upstream suppliers
Technology
 Fast changing technology  Beta faced less (still high) technological 
complexity than Alpha by choosing relatively 
proven technologies
 Rapidly changing technologies e.g. wind turbine 
and foundation: suppliers expected to constantly 
innovate
In summary, the sources of SN complexity identified in our cases reflect those that we set out 
to investigate, including the number and diversity of suppliers and the inter-connections 
amongst these. In addition to these, our findings illustrate how the varied political 
stakeholders exert influence on several SN issues, for example, related to sourcing and local 
content decisions. On relational complexity, the issues of power were less surprising than the 
importance of customer intervention in supplier selection that reflected attempts to exert 
power and influence beyond dyadic supplier relationships. Clearly, also lifecycle complexity 
added an extra dimension to SN complexity, especially as suppliers and service providers 
frequently change over the course of OWP project stages.
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4.4.3 Strategies for managing complex SNs (developer perspective)
In this section we focus on a hub or lead firm (developer) perspective because they hold the 
power as downstream customers to influence their SNs. In comparison, most suppliers (except 
for the wind turbine suppliers) merely cope with developer demands and, sometimes, 1st tier 
suppliers; generally suppliers do not have a complexity management strategy. 
The findings show that the two developers operate in distinctly different ways when it comes 
to managing SN complexity. Table 2 captures our case study comparisons divided into SN 
structure, risk management, project complexity and change, and governance and relationship 
management. SN structure and project complexities and changes are important contextual 
factors that influence the chosen strategies, which centre on choices of governance and 
relationship management approaches. 
Each case reveals a very different focal firm SN strategy. Where Alpha tries to govern and 
control its SN through intervening in sub-tier decisions and reducing dependency by using 
multi-sourcing arrangements, Beta only has a few major contracts. Beta has no power to 
intervene (especially in relation to wind turbine generator suppliers), and therefore relies on 
delegation. Exploiting its power advantage, Alpha manages a large number of contracts with 
1st tier suppliers and attempt to influence sub-tier suppliers. Alpha takes on many project 
management and engineering tasks instead of delegating these to suppliers. Alpha seeks to 
mitigate risk through a strategy of detailed scenario planning, detailed contracts and 
intervention, while Beta minimizes risk by delegating coordination and risk to suppliers 
through systems sourcing strategies. 
Table 2. Strategies of Alpha and Beta SNs compared
Alpha SN (control & intervene) Beta SN (coordinate and delegate)
SN structure Large number of 1st tier suppliers
Detailed multi-contracting: 130-180 
contracts in typical project
Few 1st tier suppliers: systems suppliers
Often only 3-4 main contracts in typical 
project with only few EPCI contracts. 
S
N
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
Focal firm size Large offshore Developer
Financially strong
Minor offshore developer 
Limited financial strength
Project and 
lifecycle 
complexity
SN often changes from project to project 
Increased size of projects 
Projects further offshore on deeper waters 
Differences in regulations & lack of standards
SN often change from project to project
Increased size of projects, but Beta does not 
engage in very large projects
Differences in regulations & lack of 
standards
Pipeline line 
up
Large and continuous projects line up Limited and scattered projects line up
P
ro
je
ct
 c
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 &
 
ch
a
n
g
e
Driver of 
project 
development
OWP development and operation
Late investor involvement
Cash flow and infusion generation
Early investor involvement
S
N
 s
tr
a
te
g
y
: 
G
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 &
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
Governance, 
power & 
dependency
Relies on tight control and intervention (e.g. 
to 2nd tier)
Wind turbine generator (WTG) producers 
powerful but power shift towards large 
developers as new WTG producers emerge
Other actors seen as less powerful/highly 
dependent on developer (Alpha)
Mutual dependency developer - WTG.
Alpha is free to select suppliers 
Project coordination and control of sub-
suppliers delegated to 1st tier suppliers
WTG producers are powerful due to limited 
number. Others are less powerful.
Developer highly dependent on WTG 
manufacturers: some WTG actors neglect 
developer tenders 
Suppliers bankable: narrow supply market
Investors are influential 
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Relationship 
Management
Open tendering process (public)
Hub firm: moving from semi-close towards 
arms length relationships towards 1st tier
No frame agreements between developer - 
1st tier suppliers
Some frame agreements with strategically 
important suppliers
Controlled tendering process (private)
Hub firm: Arms length (avoid risk of lock in) 
towards 1st tier
No frame agreements between developer & 
1st tier suppliers
Some frame agreements with strategically 
important suppliers
Risk sharing & 
approach
Risk (and gain) concentrated at developer
Late Investor Involvement
Hub firm: Risk avoidant. Risk (and gain) 
distributed through systems sourcing
Early Investor Involvement
Knowledge 
sharing
Most knowledge sharing through developer 
as hub but not intentionally shared
Knowledge sharing - not intentionally shared
Alpha is the powerful actor in the industry and within its SN due to its sheer size and perceived 
expertise in OWP that enable it to exert significant power over its suppliers. However, as wind 
turbines remain a bottleneck, wind turbine manufactures also perceived as holding power in 
the SN. Turbine suppliers need to present a liable track-record for investors to enter new 
projects. The major developers are very aware of the challenge presented by relying on a few 
powerful suppliers, so they encourage new turbines from new suppliers. Other suppliers do 
not create the same dependency. However, this may change, as the supply market 
consolidates. Neither of the developers has framework agreements with its first-tier suppliers; 
as one developer articulated it  we dont want to be locked to a specific supplier ... just 
imagine if another supplier came up with something new, and were stuck with old 
technology. 
4.4.4 Strategies for managing complex SNs (supplier perspectives)
Suppliers try to get closer to customers to access information as soon as possible on, for 
example, the type of turbine considered by the customer. They do this to reduce integration 
complexity and to be able to address issues on product interphases and processes up front, 
especially as suppliers realise that Alpha has a strong record of winning concessions at very 
low prices. Therefore, suppliers are aware that they need early involvement with developers 
to enable them to deliver the required low cost. As expressed by an O&M supplier:
  we try to get customers to understand that two cost structures exist. One thing is the raw 
product cost and then there is the cost embedded in the current process   so, we are now 
entering a dialog with two customers on how to lower process cost, by challenging 
conventional wisdom - e.g. what is need to have and not just nice to have.
Some 2nd tier suppliers have initiated discussions of relationship mutuality and a need to 
increase transparency and improve integration in order to reduce cost. When suppliers 
interact with developers such as Beta this is particularly important, as they leave technicalities 
to suppliers to work out. As the O&M supplier explained:  the dialog with them is that they 
just need a kit with an uptime so and so, can we deliver this? Yes, we can do that at this cost, 
and they rarely interfere technology wise  
Alpha strategy of SN control and intervention means that suppliers have far less freedom to 
act. For example, Alpha influences some sub-tier supplier selection decisions, leaving 1st tier 
suppliers little choice but to accept Alphas decisions. As our interview with a wind turbine 
supplier explained: 
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After all, it is a little difficult for us because... they sometimes have some opinions about 
certain suppliers, where they say: we do not want them. And we have a bit of a hard time... if 
they push us hard enough to make sure the bits that come in their mills come from that 
supplier. But as a starting point we simply have to be able to control it ourselves...
Intervention in sub-tier supplier selection - directed sourcing  could therefore leave 1st tier 
suppliers in a difficult position. However, wind turbine manufacturers themselves would also 
sometimes employ a similar strategy, thus mimicking Alphas strategy, and leave its own 
suppliers i  a similar situation.  
5. DISCUSSION 
Extant research has conceptualized supply chains and networks as inherently complex and 
dynamic (Carter et al., 2015) but some industries are faced with higher levels of complexity 
than others. Choi and Hong (2002) describe SN complexity in terms of horizontal complexity, 
vertical complexity, and spatial complexity from a structural perspective i.e. the number and 
diversity of suppliers, the number of tiers and the extent of global sourcing. Complexity in 
OWP can arise from horizontal, vertical and spatial complexities (Alpha) and one or more of 
these dimensions of complexities (Beta). Our study indicates that these structural aspects of 
SN, indeed, contribute to complexity. However, other elements of SN complexity dominated 
in the OWP SNs. For example, uncertain challenges induced by weather, non-repeatability of 
tasks such as installation challenges vary depending on the location of the wind farms, political 
influences and variability in government regulations, power/dependence relationships with 
few, major wind turbine manufacturers and the need for risk mitigation.
Our study shows both focal firms (developers) faced complexities due to SN changes 
throughout the different phases of a project: suppliers may change from project to project, 
due to supplier technology, capability, availability and prices and likewise they face a lack of 
industry standards, not only technology standards, but also governmental standards such as 
differences in health and safety regulations in different countries. Neither developer 
encourages knowledge sharing in their SNs to prevent knowledge leaks, but this means that 
there is a general lack of information sharing and information is unevenly distributed amongst 
SN actors. 
Despite the extensive use of CAS to conceptualize complexity in SNs (Choi et al., 2001, Choi 
and Hong, 2002; Choi and Krause, 2006; Bozarth et al., 2009), our case studies do not offer 
conclusive evidence of self-organization, emergence or rugged landscapes. The Alpha SN is 
purposive rather than emergent since their strategy for managing their SN emphasizes tight 
control coupled with multi-tier contracting with suppliers. Alpha uses tight control over its SN 
extending deep into their SN (suggestive of an interventionist strategy to manage their SN). 
Beta, in contrast, manages its SN through fewer contracts with its tier-one suppliers, 
delegating authority to them to manage sub-suppliers (suggestive of a cascading, or 
delegation, coordination strategy). Although Beta controls its tier-1 suppliers via contracts, 
the delegation approach offers limited opportunity to witness emergence in its SN. Both case 
studies suggest that self-organization characteristic of CAS is not present in the wind power 
industry. We conjecture that there are two principal reasons for this: 1) OWP industry is in 
early stage of its development with few options for suppliers and sub-suppliers (e.g. wind 
turbine manufacturers). The rate of growth in this regulated industry is insufficient to promote 
Page 17 of 25 Supply Chain Management: an International Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Supply Chain M
anagem
ent: an International Journal
18
rapid and sizeable expansion of the SN. The volumes of transactions are smaller compared to 
the manufacturing context where concepts of CAS have been shown to hold promise as 
theoretical perspective; and 2) the overwhelming importance accorded to risk mitigation and 
risk management by the developers. 
In contrast, our case evidence mirrors the tenets of organizational behaviour theory and 
organizational economics. For example, both Alpha and Beta seek to control and coordinate 
their SN through carefully tailored contracts. The case studies also suggest that contractual 
governance dominates relationship management. We find evidence for the interventionist 
and cascade approaches to managing complex SNs. The case studies also support the PCP and 
CoPS perspectives. PCP addresses the challenges in industrial sectors such as OWP that face 
high levels of complexity and where the focus is on securing both products and services over 
a long period of time. The case studies exemplify the conditions that the PCP perspective 
addresses, in that Alpha and Beta pursue capital-intensive public-private collaborations where 
there is an increased risk of oligopolistic market conditions and frequent political interference. 
Our case studies comport well with Roehrich and Lewis (2014) who assert that PCP defines 
complexity in terms of the extent to which infrastructural components of the whole system 
are highly customized, the number of stakeholders and the length of planning/contracting 
negotiation and construction phases. These dimensions that are not typically included in CAS 
research indeed contribute to co plexity in OWP industry. The CoPS perspective stresses 
product-service bundles: both cases suggest that this perspective might be more useful than 
the CAS in managing complexity in OWP SNs. These inferences based on our case studies are 
suggestive and not conclusive. They merit further investigation in other complex SNs in 
industries such as ship building, oil and gas and aerospace.
Our findings indicate that although it may be possible for one developer firm to exert a large 
amount of control over its SN, power and control are distributed across several powerful 
actors, even though both developers faced similar complexity and challenges. Alpha pursues 
a strategy, in which they engage in multi-sourcing/contracting and multi-tier arrangements, 
seeking to govern and control all the interphases in the project, including technology 
interphases, sometimes even employing the crew for installation; specify lower tier suppliers 
and activities they exert their power throughout the SN. Alpha takes upon itself the risk of 
coordination errors, but at the same time aims to reduce cost through an SN intervention and 
control strategy, seeking to optimize interphases in a belief that their project management 
capabilities provide a competitive advantage. Furthermore, given its size and pipeline of 
projects in the industry, Alpha seeks internal process optimization and learning from project 
to project, pursuing what is termed a project factory i.e. standardizing project management 
processes. In contrast, Beta opts to engage in a delegated SN strategy, relying on systems and 
delegated sourcing arrangements with a small number of 1st tier suppliers. Beta assumes a 
coordination responsibility but mainly between the four major installations turbines, 
substations, foundations and cables, delegating coordination and risk further down the chain 
to 1st tier suppliers. This strategy resembles an SN coordination and delegation strategy. 
Given its size and buy strategy on project capabilities, Beta can employ an opportunistic 
strategy towards which projects to bid for and take upon them. Building on our case findings 
we therefore propose a classification of two different complex SN strategies in Table 3.
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Table 3. A classification of strategies for managing complex OWP SNs
SN control & 
intervention strategy
SN coordination & delegation strategy
Governance Tight control and detailed interface management Delegated responsibility and systems sourcing 
Power use Sub-tier intervention
Engage with many 1st tier suppliers
1st tier delegation of responsibility
Engage with few 1st tier suppliers
Contracting Detailed multi, and multi-level, contracting Few contracts, mainly with 1st tier suppliers
Risk sharing Interface risks on complex projects 
Risk taking
SN partners carry risks through turnkey 
contracts 
Risk sharing
Project portfolio 
management 
Seek optimization of a portfolio of projects 
Project factory
Opportunistic approach to project selection  
no pipeline 
In addition to SN complexity literature, our classification builds on the taxonomy by Harland 
et al. (2001) in that it concerns the level of influence of the focal firm. We thereby contribute 
to existing SN classifications, especially those that include a complexity dimension (Lamming 
et al., 2000; Caniato et al., 2011), although our cases represent a higher level of complexity 
and include aspects of complexity e.g. lifecycle and regulations that are not considered in 
extant SN classifications. We also build and expand on Johnsens (2011) concept of SN 
delegation and intervention, which in turn builds on Lammings (1996) concepts of supply 
chain cascade and intervention, organizational behaviour (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; 
Osterloh and Frey, 2000) and organizational economics (Williamson, 1996) literature. To date 
the concepts of delegation and intervention have not been applied in a complex SN context. 
Our research shows how one developer firm applies an SN control and intervention strategy 
through its SN governance, intervening in interface and risk management and contracting in 
sub-tier relationships. In contrast, the other developer firm adopts a strategy of coordination 
and delegation using systems sourcing strategies to delegate and empower 1st tier suppliers 
to manage its own sub-tier relationships. Clearly, this is an attempt to mimic a modularization 
approach, aiming to reduce the number of mountain peaks in the landscape and thereby 
decrease the number of interfaces and inter-dependencies (Choi et al., 2001; Kauffman, 
1995). As found by Pero et al. (2010), product modularity reduces supply chain collaboration 
complexity, which is clearly an issue for the OWP industry. However, the OWP industry has a 
long way to go before it resembles the modular structure found in, for example, the 
automotive industry (Doran et al., 2007) and the nature of the OWP industry may not easily 
develop in that direction as power is more distributed amongst typical SN actors and political 
stakeholders. 
One managerial implication of our research is the identification of more strategies for focal 
firms for managing and maneuvering in complex SNs. The strategies depend on several factors 
such as the level of power and influence of the focal firm over other SN actors. Our 
classification of strategies concern both appropriate ways to manage dyadic relationships and 
ways to manage - or manage within - the wider SNs. Another managerial implication is that 
suppliers in complex SNs should foresee the operational models to co-exist and develop 
flexible business models and value propositions to honour different operating models. For 
example, 1st tier suppliers need to be able to concurrently act as a component and a systems 
supplier, with all the challenges this induces. As the OWP industry matures it is likely that we 
will see increasing standardisation and modularisation; both developer firms and suppliers 
therefore need to be clear about which SN strategy they will pursue. 
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In deciding on alternative strategies, managers should consider the firms SN position, the 
complementarity of technologies accessible from different SN actors, and the method with 
which the focal firm controls suppliers. These factors will influence the ability of a firm to 
capitalise on innovations through its SN. Whereas intervention in suppliers operations is a 
way to control SNs and thereby reduce risk, a delegation strategy may be more likely to 
facilitate technological innovation by empowering suppliers to pursue innovative solutions.
Although we would caution against drawing managerial implications beyond the OWP 
industry, the themes and methods we highlight in our classification framework would appear 
to resemble those found in other complex SNs that may therefore still gain inspiration from 
this framework.   
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed generic strategies for managing complex SNs, focusing on the OWP 
industry. This industry is of strategic importance to many countries that have invested heavily 
to reduce the reliance on fossil-based fuels and shift towards renewable sources of energy. 
The industry is truly complex not only due to the size of the product-service systems involved, 
which means large supply bases, but also because of the changing phases that involve 
development, installation and operations & maintenance. SNs change over the course of 
these phases, posing different challenges within and across each phase. OWP SNs are 
distributed because of the number of actors that try to control them (Andersen and Drejer, 
2008) but complexity is also high because of the nature of these actors as these include 
political stakeholders. OWP SNs include many powerful actors (stakeholders) who seek to 
exert their power and influence. Such complexity is not considered in the existing research on 
complex SNs (e.g. Choi et al., 2001).
Our initial findings do not allow us to compare the two SN strategies and associated decisions 
in terms of performance. Hence, we cannot at this stage determine superiority of one 
approach over the other, or under which circumstances, but merely observe that two distinct 
different strategies are in operation in the same industry facing the same complexities and 
challenges. This is a future research avenue that could be explored. The argument that 
extensive control may detract from innovation and flexibility was not observed in our cases, 
as Alpha is a successful developer firm. Hence, a future research avenue is to explore if this 
argument only holds for specific circumstances (e.g. industry type and maturity, type of 
control mechanisms in use, focus for intervention etc.). Betas reliance on system sourcing is 
a step towards the use of modular product architectures that may over time result in modular 
SNs. This would decrease the current high levels of SN complexity. However, the OWP industry 
is not yet a mature industry and the project nature of the industry, with SNs changing over 
time across different project phases, and individual projects, may also present challenges in 
mimicking the modular SNs in, for example, the automotive industry. Modularity and its 
impact, in such an industry (large complex projects) would likewise be an interesting research 
path to follow. As in other case study research, ours is not without its limitations. The case 
study firms were selected purposively to gain access to firms with interest in our study. The 
data also represent a limited sampling of the SNs of the two firms. It would be useful to gather 
data from more suppliers within SNs via other methods (as case studies are time and effort 
intensive). The findings from our case studies may not generalize to other contexts. 
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Appendix A: Abbreviated Interview Protocol
Sources
General background information:
 Your role and responsibility in organization?
 Major products, services?
 Customer requirements? Core competencies of organization?
 Major strategic development in your company and industry? 
Project & lifecycle complexity: 
1. What key functions are involved in different phases of OWP projects and how 
are they dependent on each other?
2. What are challenges in managing different competencies in different stages of 
OWP project?
3. At which OWP project stage(s) are your products/services procured and 
delivered? 
4. Would you describe products and services of your organization as 
technologically complex? 
5. Initiatives to reduce project complexity (challenges/examples)? 
Baccarini (1996)
Lamming et al, 2000)
Bozarth et al. (2009)
Pathak et al. (2007)
Caniato et al. (2011)
Roehrich and Lewis 
(2014)
Structural complexity (SN) questions and mapping: 
6. Which actors are involved during several OWP project stages and how? 
7. Other important actors e.g. commissioning organisations? 
8. While mapping the supply network please 
a. Types of suppliers and locations  include key tier 2 suppliers?
b. Number of suppliers?
c. Other aspects that make coordination with them difficult?
9. How does your organization integrate/coordinate with these? 
10. Do you use full systems or service providers? 
11. Initiatives to reduce project and/or supply network complexity? 
12. What is your supply chain integration strategy? How do you try to integrate 
and influence supply network?
13. Which integration mechanisms or tools are used to manage supply network? 
Baccarini (1996)
Lamming et al. (2000)
(Choi et al. (2001)
Choi and Hong (2002)
Choi and Krause (2006)
Vachon and Klassens 
(2002) 
Bozarth et al. (2009)
Pathak et al. (2007)
Roehrich and Lewis 
(2014)
Relationships and inter-dependencies/power balance (governance 
complexity): 
14. Your sourcing strategies with your various suppliers e.g. single, dual and/or 
multi-sourcing arrangements?
15. Which suppliers or service providers are classified as strategic and how are 
your relationships with these?
16. Risk and reward sharing arrangements with key partners?
17. Who are most powerful in supply network and why? 
18. How do they control supply network?
19. Is balance of power in supply network changing and how?
20. Any actors influence your supplier selection (e.g. customers or political 
actors)? 
21. What kind of contracts do you have with your most important partners?
22. What else makes your supply network complex?
Baccarini (1996)
Choi and Krause (2006)
Vachon and Klassens 
(2002) 
Bozarth et al. (2009)
Olsen et al. (2005)
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